Direct GME funding from Medicare is calculated by a ratio of the total number of inpatient days spent by Medicare patients divided by the total number of inpatient days by all patients in a specific hospital. Residents in primary care specialties (ie, family medicine, general internal medicine, general osteopathic medicine, general pediatrics, geriatric medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, and preventive medicine) receive a slightly higher PRA because of a 6% inflation update in 1994 and 1995 that was not similarly adjusted for non-primary care residents. 7, 6 Teaching hospitals generally incur more costs because they have a sicker patient load and more nonquantifiable costs (eg, residents ordering extra tests) and therefore receive additional indirect GME funding.
IN MY VIEW
Direct GME funding from Medicare is calculated by a ratio of the total number of inpatient days spent by Medicare patients divided by the total number of inpatient days by all patients in a specific hospital. Residents in primary care specialties (ie, family medicine, general internal medicine, general osteopathic medicine, general pediatrics, geriatric medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, and preventive medicine) receive a slightly higher PRA because of a 6% inflation update in 1994 and 1995 that was not similarly adjusted for non-primary care residents. 7, 6 Teaching hospitals generally incur more costs because they have a sicker patient load and more nonquantifiable costs (eg, residents ordering extra tests) and therefore receive additional indirect GME funding. 8 Indirect GME payments are based on a formula of the ratio of the number of interns and residents and the number of patient beds (institutional review board [IRB] ratio) adjusted with a variable multiplier and IRB ratio caps that are set by
Congress. Indirect GME payments are not weighted like direct GME funding in which the number of residents in their "initial residency period" are counted as 1.0 FTE and those beyond this period as 0.5 FTE. These funding formulas are adjusted with each new legislative action on GME. sought to shift the fee-for-service payment structure to more value-and performance-based payments.
Currently, federal GME funding has direct and indirect components. Direct GME funding provides teaching hospitals with direct costs for GME training, such as salaries and benefits of residents, faculty, and administrative staff, as well as allocated institutional overhead costs (eg, electricity, space rental, and maintenance). Each hospital receives individualized direct GME funding as a per-resident amount (PRA) that is calculated as the direct GME outcomes for patients. The proposed GME Policy
Council and GME Center would address these goals.
Opposing Argument
No added benefit and more bureaucratic inefficiencies would result from the creation of new infrastructure without addressing the issues of the current system.
IOM Recommendation #3
Eliminate the direct GME and indirect GME structure and replace them with 2 subsidiary funds: a GME Operational Fund to support existing residency training positions and a GME Transformational Fund to focus on innovation and programs in needed and underserved areas.
Supporting Argument
The GME Operational Fund would provide for currently existing programs to avoid destabilizing GME funding during the proposed transition. The GME Transformational Fund would support the pilot of innovating alternative payment systems and developing performance measures. The current funding structure is inflexible regarding the funding of new programs and non-hospital-based GME sites. Additionally, GME funding currently is disproportionately appropriated between different states; New York currently receives 20% of all of Medicare's GME funding.
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Opposing Argument
Directing money toward geographic, subspecialty, or various nonhospital health care settings will not necessarily provide more health care professionals in these underserved areas or primary care specialties once trainees graduate. Student loan and educational financing structures must change to incentivize practicing in locations, specialties, or health care settings with the most need. Teaching hospitals, especially urban-based hospitals, where much GME currently takes place, also would be disproportionately affected.
IOM Recommendation #1
Aggregate GME funding should remain at current levels and maintain Medicare support. The total support would be adjusted for inflation over the next 10 years while the recommended new GME policy is implemented. The goal would be to gradually phase out and replace the current payment system with one that is more performance based.
Supporting Argument
The current GME system is unsustainable and needs performance-and value-based reform. The proposed system would provide stable (albeit not increased) funding during this transitional period.
Opposing Argument
The rate of increase has not kept up with inflation, 
IOM Recommendation #2
A GME Policy Council should be established in the 
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IOM Recommendation #4
Funding should be based on PRA only, with geographic adjustments paid directly to GME sponsors responsible for postgraduate physician training rather than to the teaching hospital. Payments based on Medicare inpatient days, IRB ratio, and other factors currently in the funding formula should end. Graduate medical education sponsors can be teaching hospitals, educational institutions, community health centers, GME programs by children's hospitals, or GME consortia. 
IOM Recommendation #5
Medicaid GME funding should remain at the state's discretion. Congress should mandate the same level of transparency and accountability in Medicaid GME as it will require under the proposed Medicare GME changes.
Supporting Argument
Medicaid has always been under state and not federal regulation. As with all public funds, there must be transparency in how Medicaid dollars are spent
for GME and what objectives are available to assess and direct effective use. States may need to define and enforce more specific guidelines on the use of these funds by GME sites.
Opposing Argument
Currently, little information is available on Medicaid GME programs because many states defer to hospital discretion on how they use these funds. No standardization exists among states or, in many cases, criteria and safeguards are lacking to enforce that these funds are used in a manner to support specific GME goals and policies.
Conclusion
The IOM recommendations propose to support a more targeted, performance-based investment in the training of our future health care workforce.
We need to commit and invest in long-term strategies at all levels, from building social infrastructure that encourages health equity, to providing universal health coverage, to decreasing the financial burden of medical education, and to continuing to support and fund GME.
I encourage you to become more informed and more involved in health policy advocacy with your organized academic medical societies to lobby for your beliefs on this issue and to ensure appropriate GME funding is supported. Second, on page 932, the authors discussed their inability to locate officially recognized no-blood advance directive forms. Although these forms are not publically available to non-Jehovah's Witnesses, they are privately available to members within their own churches. Members are encouraged to complete and carry these forms in their wallets, and medical institutions are encouraged to copy them and keep them with the patient's medical record.
Finally, on page 931 the statement "The Jehovah's Witness Hospital
Liaison Committee physician members supported the use of FFP in this case because the patient was already receiving plasma fraction products" was incorrect and should have been omitted. These corrections will be made to the electronic files online. 
